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CONTRACTS NOT TO REVOKE JOINT OR MUTUAL WILLS
A joint will is a testamentary instrument executed by two or more
persons. Mutual wills are separate wills of two or more testators, recip-
rocal in nature. Although the validity of joint wills was placed in doubt
by early English decisions,' the clear weight of modern authority in
England and the United States is that joint as well as mutual wills are
valid if properly drawn.2
Analytical difficulties arise when a joint will or mutual wills are ac-
companied by a contract not to revoke. Many courts either have failed
1. The first reported decision involving a joint will was Dufour v. Pereira, 1 Dick.
419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (1769), in which a husband and wife executed a joint will pursuant
to a contract not to revoke. The court upheld the rights of the beneficiaries under the
will when the wife later attempted to revoke it and make a different testamentary dis-
position. The court was impressed "more from the novelty of the thing than its diffi-
culty" Id. at 420, 21 Eng. Rep. at 333. Six years later, however, Lord Mansfield stated
that "there cannot be a joint will." Darlington v. Pulteney, 1 Comp. 260, 268, 98 Eng-
Rep. 1075, 1079 (1775). Although this pronouncement has resulted in frequent state-
ments that the English common law did not recognize joint wills, Professor Sparks has
noted that it is unclear whether Mansfield's statement "was intended as a proposition of
law or merely as a statement that a joint will could not accomplish the result that was
sought in the case with which he was concerned." B. SPARKs, CoNratrs TO MAKE WLLS
8-9 (1956).
One reason suggested for the slow development of the joint will concept was the in-
hibitng effect of the status of married women at common law See, e.g., Eagleton, Joint
and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL
L.Q. 358, 359 (1930). Case analysis, however, reveals that the primary reason for this
delay was the failure of courts to recognize the contractual aspects of these testamentary
devices:
When the contract involved the making of a will as the manner of per-
formance, the fixed contractual obligation appeared to clash with the in-
herent ambulatory nature of a will. Somehow it was felt that the will neces-
sarily became a part of the contract. In the midst of these poorly defined and
apparently conflicting views, it is little wonder that the various courts dealing
with the nature of the relationship created by a contract to make a will
reached widely varying results.
B. SPAREns, supra at 15.
2. See generally Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452 (1857); Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill.
80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); Black v. Richards, 95 Ind. 184 (1883); Culver v Hess, 234 Iowa
877, 14 N.W.2d 692 (1944); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915);
In re Davis' Will, 120 N.C. 9, 26 S.E. 636 (1897); In re Cawley's Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20
A. 567 (1890); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 S.E. 749 (1918); Cummings v.
Sherman, 16 Wash. 2d 88, 132 P.2d 998 (1943); Sipple v. Zimmerman, 39 Wis. 2d 481,
159 N.W.2d 706 (1968).
In Louisiana, however, joint wills are declared void by statute. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 1572 (1952).
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to distinguish the concept of wills from that of contracts or have
neglected to use precise language in defining the legal relationshups cre-
ated by a joint or mutual will executed pursuant to a contractual agree-
ment. Indeed, some courts have refused to acknowledge the existence
of a contract, holding simply that joint or mutual wills executed under
certain circumstances are "irrevocable." 3 Most jurisdictions, however,
adhere to the traditional view that wills are inherently ambulatory in
nature and that "irrevocability" depends upon the existence of a valid
contract; thus, it is the express or implied contract between the parties,
and not the will, which prevents the survivor from altering the scheme
of disposition upon which the parties had agreed.4
Serious consequences may result when a surviving testator is prevented
from altering the disposition of his property because of an agreement
not to revoke his will. In examining contracts not to revoke joint or
mutual wills, particular attention must be given to the issues surrounding
formation and proof of the existence of such a contract. If a valid con-
tract is found to exist, it is then necessary to analyze its effect on the
surviving testator's right to revoke his will and on his ability to dispose
of after-acquired property The effect of anti-lapse statutes on a joint
will or mutual wills and the manner of enforcement of contracts not to
revoke are also important considerations in evaluating the desirability of
joint or mutual wills as testamentary devices.
I. Fo RmATioN AND PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT
There are various circumstances under which courts may find that
joint or mutual wills were executed pursuant to a preexisting contract
not to revoke. A separate written contract may declare a will "irre-
vocable," or the testamentary device itself may expressly declare its ex-
ecution pursuant to a preexisting agreement not to revoke. Moreover,
some courts have stated that the execution of a joint will with reciprocal
provisions creates a presumption that the parties intended the dispositions
3. Cf. Warwick v. Zimmerman, 126 Kan. 619, 270 P. 612 (1928); In re McGinley's
Estate, 257 Pa. 478, 101 A. 807 (1917).
4. See, e.g., Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N.E. 1151 (1892); In re Lieurance's
Estate, 181 Ore. 646, 182 P.2d 969 (1947); Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96 S.E.
749 (1918); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W 763 (1924).
Much of the confusion surrounding joint wills and mutual wills derives from im-
precision of terminology The expression "contract to make a will" implies an agree-
ment to make a testamentary disposition and is not appropriate where testators have
contracted to render irrevocable their previously agreed upon dispositions. An agree-
ment of the latter type is a "contract not to revoke a will."
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to be irrevocable.5 The leading American case advocating this position is-
Frazier v. Patterson,6 in which it was stated:
If two persons make wills, each devising his property to the other,
there is no necessary inference that the wills were the result of any
mutual or reciprocal agreement or understanding. Such wills might
be executed without either party knowing that the other had ex-
ecuted his will; but where the parties execute their wills by the
same instrument, it is not possible that such course could be adopted
without some previous understanding or agreement between them.?
This result has been strongly criticized,8 and today the majority of juns-
dictions hold that the mere execution of a joint will is not sufficient to
prove the existence of a prior contract not to revoke.9
5. In re Estate of Chayka, 40 Wis. 2d 715, 162 N.W.2d 632, 634 (1968) ("[A] contract
to make mutual and reciprocal wills may be conclusively presumed or inferred from pro-
visions of the wills themselves, especially if there is a jointly executed will.") (emphasis
supplied); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 607-08, 198 N.W 763, 766 (1924) ("[A] pre-
existing contract to make mutual and reciprocal wills may be conclusively inferred from
the provisions of the wills themselves (especially if they be joint), in light of circum-
stances existmg at the time the wills were executed.") (emphasis supplied); Rastetter v.
Hoenmnger, 214 N.Y. 66, 72, 108 N.E. 210, 211 (1915). See also T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 49,
at 223, 226 (2d ed. 1953); B. Spucs, supra note 1, at 28; Bailey, Contracts to Make Wills-
Proof of Intent to Contract, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 941, 954 (1962); Evans, Concerted Wills:
A Possible Device for Avoiding the Widow's Privilege of Renunciation, 33 Ky. L.J. 79,
94-95 (1945).
6. 243 Il. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).
7 Id. at 86, 90 N.E. at 218 (emphasis supplied).
8. See Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 P 1065 (1924).
9. See, e.g., Estate of Randall v. McKibben, 191 N.W.2d 693, 699 (Iowa 1971) ("A
greater quantum of proof than the mere execution of a joint will is, however, essential
to the creation of a mutual testamentary instrument."); In re Estate of Miller, 186 Kan.
87, 95-97, 348 P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (1960) ("The general rule is that the execution of a
joint will is not of itself sufficient evidence of an enforceable contract to devise between
the testators, so as to make the contract enforceable in equity [Where a joint and
mutual will is executed by a husband and wife the will itself and its terms may be taken
into consideration as circumstantial evidence upon which to base a finding that the will
is contractual. This is not to say that the execution of a joint and mutual will compels
such an inference."); Cram v. Mitchell, 479 S.W2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) ("A
will is not necessarily contractual merely because it is executed jointly, even though
its terms are mutual and reciprocal.") But see Schwartz v. Schwartz, 273 Wis. 404, 411,
78 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1956) ("A will which is jointly executed may furnish in itself
prima facie proof that it was executed pursuant to a contract between the testators,
notwithstanding it does not expressly purport to have been made pursuant to a contract,
does not contain the word 'contract' or 'agreement', or include an express promise that
the survivor will carry out the dispositions contained in the will.") (emphasis supplied).
See also T. ATNsoN, supra note 5, § 49, at 226; 1 PAGE oN WILLS § 10.4, at 444 (3d ed.
1960); B. SpAaKs, supra note 1, at 27
[Vol. 15-144-
1973] CONTRACTS NOT TO REVOKE
In the case of mutual wills, most courts require "clear and convincing"
evidence that the parties agreed to make their testamentary dispositions
irrevocable. 0 For example, in Edson v. Parsons". mutual wills were ex-
ecuted by two sisters. The court acknowledged evidence "that their
lives ran in one groove and were so blended, that they seemed to
experience the same emotions, to view occurrences with the same eyes
and to be moved to the performance of common acts." '2 Nevertheless,
the evidence was found insufficient to establish a contract not to revoke,
the court holding that proof that the testatrices had acted in concert
and with a similarity of purpose did not establish that a binding agree
ment of such far-reaching consequence was intended.'3
As a probative minimum, the "clear and convincing" standard relates
to a number of corroborative evidentiary factors. Evidence, for instance,
that the parties "discussed" the manner of final disposition of their proper-
ty might not alone be sufficient to support the inference; however, such
proof may be sufficient if combined with other material evidence,
such as identical dispositions of property, the use of plural pronouns
when describing the property, or retention of the same attorney and
10. See, e.g., Kisor v. Litzenberg, 203 Iowa 1183, 1187, 212 N.W 343, 345 (1927)("[PJroof, when resting in parol, must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing."); In re
Estate of LeBorius, 224 Minn. 203, 214, 28 N.W.2d 157, 163 (1947) ("clear, positive, and
convincing"); Gromek v. Gidzela, 36 N.J. Super. 212, 218, 115 A.2d 144, 147 (App. Div.
1955) ("In any case, a parol agreement to execute irrevocable mutual wills is subject
to close scrutiny Such an agreement is permitted to stand only when established by
evidence that is cogent, clear and convincing, leaving no doubt in the court's mind as to
the parties actually having entered into such an agreement."); Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash.
2d 35, 37, 129 P.2d 813, 817-18 (1942) ("Contracts to make mutual wills are recognized
under our law as valid, and, when sufficient facts are proven by competent evidence,
such contracts may be specifically enforced. Because, however, of the great op-
portunity for fraud, and because of reluctance on the part of courts to render ineffective
a subsequent will of a testator, the contract to make mutual wills must be established
by clear and convincing evidence."). See also Clements v. Jones, 166 Ga. 738, 743, 144
S.E. 319, 322 (1928); In re Estate of McLean, 219 Wis. 222, 227, 262 N.W 707, 709-10
(1935); B. SPARKs, supra note 1, at 24.
11. 155 N.Y. 555, 50 N.E. 265 (1898).
12. Id. at 562, 50 N.E. at 266.
13. Professor Page has argued:
It is more logical to expect that in many settings, particularly that of
husband and wife, the reciprocity or similarity in the dispositive provisions
of the two wills results from similar tastes and affections that have resulted
from years of living together, and the making of identical or similar wills
was a spontaneous thing unaccompanied by even so much as a thought on
the part of either husband or wife that they should enter into a contract
with each other.
1 PAGE oN WnLzs, supra note 9, at 554.
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execution of the mutual wills at the same time and place with the same
attesting witnesses.14
It has been held that evidence of statements made by a decedent to a
beneficiary, when used to support an inference of a contract not to re-
voke a will, must meet a statutory sufficiency requirement.15 The ex-
istence of a contract has been established by testimony of the attorney
who drafted the agreement together with verification of the testators'
agreement by a business associate of one of the parties.16 Conversely, evi-
dence that a wife told her husband he could do with their estate "as he
pleased," when considered in conjunction with the wife's failure to ex-
ecute a new will which would have carried out the terms of any existing
contract between the parties, has been held to show the nonexistence
of such a contract as a matter of law I
A recent decision combimng an analysis -of corroborative factors with
the clear and convincing evidence test is Lamberg v. Callahan,8 in which
a husband and wife executed mutual wills on the same date. Although
the wills contained reciprocal provisions, the court refused to find a
contract not to revoke because "[v] tewed as a ,whole, the evidence was
msufficient to establish that [the testators] agreed that their wills would
be irrevocable." 1 Requiring substantial corroborative evidence beyond
the mere reciprocity of disposition, the court held that the evidence pre-
sented was not clear and convincing.
The clear and convincing sufficiency standard should apply not only
14. See Evans, supra note 5, at 98.
15. Won v. Dugas, 104 N.J. Super. 586, 250 A.2d 775 (1969). The court, pursuant to
a New Jersey rule of probability of evidence, held that a father's explanation to his son
of apparent disinheritance, along with other oral statements made in the wife's presence,
was sufficient to show an irrevocable contract to dispose of their total assets and that
the agreement's terms were expressed in the wills.
16. Pederson v. First Nat'l Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966). A husband
and wife had prepared separate wills with identical bequests of all property to the
survivor. The same attorney prepared both documents. After the husband died, the wife
executed a will substantially different from the earlier instruments. The trial court held
that although testimony was sufficient to show an agreement, the proper quantum of
proof-clear and convincing-had not been met in showing the terms of that agreement.
This decision was reversed, the appellate court holding: "[The attorney's] testimony
left no doubt of the purport of the agreement. Although his testimony at times
varied slightly, there was absolutely no question that the expressed intent of the agree-
ment was to make the wills contractual. [A business associate] also corroborated the
contents of that agreement and stated that the wills 'were not to be changed without
mutual consent."' 143 N.W.2d at 426.
17. Rose v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 476 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
18. 455 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
19. Id. at 1219 (emphasis supplied).
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to the question of whether the parties made an "agreement" concerning
the irrevocability of the will or wills but also to the separate formation
requirements of offer, acceptance, and consideration. A mere discussion
or acknowledgment by the parties of a particular testamentary form or
scheme should be msufficient to establish the parties' intent to enter into
a legally binding agreement. Rebutting evidence will be difficult to find
if one of the parties is dead, and, although "dead man's statutes" offer
some protection,2 a close inspection of contractual intent should be em-
ployed to guard against fraudulent claims. As one commentator has
noted:
Guarding against an otherwise probable tendency to find a con-
tract based upon moral oughtness rather than upon offer and ac-
ceptance supported by consideration is the rule requiring a higher
degree of evidence to sustain (such] a contract than is required
in contracts generally 21
The offer and acceptance should make defimte reference to a limita-
tion on the survivor's power of revocation. Thus, in Fatber Flanagan's
Boys' Home v. Turpm,22 it was held that the mere fact that the testator's
wife had convinced him to make a joint will including a bequest to her
church did not evidence "an agreement to make a contract for an irre-
vocable will or that the property of the survivor should be devised and
bequeathed in any certain way or to certain beneficiaries." " The court
observed that although the parties may have bargained for the form of
the will they would use and for the beneficiaries of their estates, they
had not agreed that the dispositions were to be irrevocable.
In examining the traditional contract requirement of consideration,
some courts have taken the position that a "promise to devise all of one's
interest in certain property is legal consideration even though the prom-
isor actually has no interest and even though the unlikelihood of his
having any interest is known to both parties at the time the bargain is
entered into." 24 Other courts, however, have examined the amount of
20. See B. SPARKs, supra note 1, at 26.
21. B. SPAms, supra note 1, at 24.
22. 252 Iowa 603, 106 N.W.2d 637 (1960).
23. Id. at 607, 106 N.W.2d at 641.
24. B. SPAits, supra note 1, at 35. In Tooker v. Vreeland, 92 N.J. Eq. 340, 345, 112 A.
665, 668, aff'd per curtam sub nom. Tooker v. Maple, 93 NJ. Eq. 224, 115 A. 255 (1921),
it was held: "The disparity in the amounts of the estates involved does not militate
against the conclusions I have come to, that the mutual wills were the outcome of a con-
tract. Equality of consideration is not essential to a binding obligation.'
1973]
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the testamentary dispositions involved and have refused specific per-
formance where the consideration flowing between the parties appears
grossly disproportionate. In re olnsons Estate,25 for example, involved
a joint will executed by a husband with a large estate and by his wife,
who had few assets and little chance of enhancing her estate except
through acquisition of assets from her husband. Holding that the wife
had not given "adequate or honest" consideration, the court refused to
enforce the alleged contract not to revoke.26
Provisions of the Statute of Frauds may constitute an obstacle to estab-
lishing the existence of a contract not to revoke.27 In most jurisdictions,
the Statute of Frauds requires that contracts for the conveyance of land
be in writing; included, of course, are contracts to devise realty 21 More-
over, courts generally hold that if a contract to devise both realty and
personalty is indivisible, the entire contract is within the Statute.29 Some
states require that any testamentary contract must be written; however,
a will which incorporates material provisions of a contract to devise may
be sufficient to satisfy the Statute.30
Another obstacle to establishing that the testators intended to enter a
contract not to revoke is the parol evidence rule. In general, as applied
to enforcement of wills, the rule operates to exclude oral testimony
25. 233 Iowa 782, 10 N.W.2d 664 (1943).
26. Compare Sample v. Butler Umv., 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E.2d 545 (1936) (mutual
agreement of the makers of the wills sufficient consideration to bind the prormsors) and
Geiger v. Geiger, 185 Neb. 700, 178 N.W.2d 575 (1970) (mutual promises of the testators
adequate consideration for the agreement) with Notten v Mensing, 20 Cal. App. 2d 694,
67 P.2d 734 (1937), in which the court held that even if an agreement not to revoke is
established, equity will not grant specific performance if the consideration is inadequate.
(The wife's estate was approximately one thousand times as large as the husband's.)
27. Contracts to devise have been held not to be within the prohibition on parol agree-
ments not to be performed within one year, since the promisor may die within the first
year. Lee v. McCrocklin's Adm'r, 247 Ky 44, 56 S.W.2d 570 (1933); T. ATKINSON, supra
note 5, § 48. Moreover, contracts to devise generally are held not to be within provisions
requiring written contracts for the sale of personalty exceeding a certain purchase price.
1 PAGE ON WILLs, supra note 9, § 10.11.
28. Masquart v. Dick, 210 Ore. 459, 310 P.2d 742 (1957)
29. E.g., Humphrey v. Faison, 247 N.C. 127, 100 S.E.2d 524 (1957)
30. Upson v. Fitzgerald, 129 Tex. 211, 102 S.W.2d 147 (1937).
Where the agreement between testators to leave joint or mutual wills rests in parol,
as is normally the case with relatives, if the survivor accepts the benefits of the first
testator's will, he may be forced to honor his agreement on the ground that part per-
formance has taken the contract outside the Statute of Frauds. Kirk v. Beard, 162 Tex.
144, 345 S.W.2d 267 (1961). Furthermore, where joint or mutual wills are executed
pursuant to an oral agreement, the execution itself has been held to be a sufficient per-
formance to take the contract outside the Statute, so long as it can be proven that the
parties bargained. See, e.g., Brown v. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 P 943 (1920).
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when the terms of the will are clear; extrinsic evidence is permitted only
when ambiguities are present.3' In its application to contracts, however,
the parol evidence rule generally excludes extrinsic evidence only when
the parties intend the writing to be the complete integration of their
agreement.32 It is important to recognize that even though provisions of
a will clearly indicate that the will was made pursuant to a contract, the
parol evidence rule should not apply to exclude evidence of the terms of
that contract, unless it can be determined that the parties intended the
will to set forth their complete agreement.
The few courts which have considered the question have tended to
confuse the manner in which the parol evidence rule should be applied.
For example, in In re Estate of Cbronister,"3 it was held that where "a
joint will shows on zts face by the terms and provisions thereof that it is
contractual in character, extrinsic evidence is not admissible for the pur-
pose of proving otherwise." 34 This holding, however, overlooks the gen-
erally accepted statement that the "parol evidence rule does not apply
to every contract of which there is written evidence, but only applies
where the parties to an agreement reduce it to writing, and agree or in-
tend that that writing shall be their agreement." 3S Thus, in Tucker v.
Zachary,36 plaintiffs were beneficiaries under mutual wills which they
claimed were executed in accordance with an oral contract not to revoke.
Defendants argued that oral testimony should not be admitted because
the testamentary dispositions had been reduced to writing. In rejecting
this proposition, the court stated that the will was "not relied upon as a
'written contract' It was offered in evidence merely as an 'instru-
ment of proof,' and it was nowhere alleged or contended that it was in
fact the agreement sued upon." '7
The Uniform Probate Code provision concerning proof of the ex-
istence of a contract not to revoke joint and mutual wills states:
Sec. 2-701. [Contracts Concerning Succession.] A contract to make
a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate,
if executed after the effective date of this Act, can be established
only by (1) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the
31. T. ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 60, at 287
32. SETIONS IMOM WILLISTON ON CoNmRacrs § 633, at 504-05 (rev. ed. 1938).
33. 203 Kan. 366,454 P.2d 438 (1969).
34. 454 P.2d at 443.
-3 5. WIusroN, supra note 32, at 504 (emphasis supplied).
36. 269 P.2d 773 (Okla. 1954)-
37. Id. at 777 (emphasis supplied).
197,31 -
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contract; (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and ex-
trinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writing
signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of
a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a
contract not to revoke the will or wills.38
The Code's denial of a presumption of a contract not to revoke from
the mere execution of a joint will or mutual wills is m accordance with
the weight of modern authority Nevertheless, although suggesting the
methods by which a contract not to revoke must be established, the Code
fails to define factors which will assure that the parties acted with the
necessary contractual intent. Thus, section 2-701 appears to suffer from
the same infirmities which it has been argued are present in the "clear
and convincing evidence" rule: "There is good reason to fear that the
'clear-and-convincing-evidence rule,' together with the 'deadman's' stat-
ute and other safeguards, has not afforded adequate protection in the
case of joint wills and mutual wills against the danger of finding a con-
tract where no intent to contract really existed." 19
In order to establish the necessary contractual intent, a number of
indicia should be scrutinized. These considerations, none of which stand-
ing alone generally will be sufficient evidence of a contract, may include
the relationship of the parties, language in the will or wills indicating
not only a preexisting agreement on testamentary dispositions but also
an agreement that such disposition be irrevocable, evidence that the
parties acted in concert in executing the will or wills, use of plural pro-
nouns when referring to property and identical dispository provisions
concerning such property, and declarations of the testators before or
38. The Comment to section 2-701 states:
It is the purpose of this section to tighten the methods by which contracts
concerning succession may be proved. Oral contracts not to revoke wills
have given rise to much litigation in a number of states; and in many states
if two persons execute a single document as their joint will, this gives rise
to a presumption that the parties had contracted not to revoke the will
except by consent of both.
This section requires that either the will must set forth the material pro-
visions of the contract, or the will must make express reference to the con-
tract and extrinsic evidence [proving] the terms of the contract, or there
must be a separate writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
Oral testimony regarding the contract is permitted if the will makes reference
to the contract, but this provision of the statute is not intended to affect
normal rules regarding admissibility of evidence.
The Uniform Probate Code has been enacted in Idaho and Alaska and is under con-
sideration in 16 other states. I PROBATE & PRoP, Tv 4 (April 1973).
39. Bailey, supra note 5, at 953.
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after execution of the instrument. A rule which requires that a contract
not to revoke a will can be established only by clear and convincing
evidence and which does not presume the existence of a contract from
any one factor is necessary in light of the harsh consequences which may
result when a surviving testator is precluded from altering the disposition
of his estate to meet changed circumstances.
II. OPERATIVE EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT
The vast majority of courts have held that joint or mutual wills, even
though executed pursuant to a contract not to revoke, retain the quality
of revocability 40 However, a few courts continue to hold that a will
executed pursuant to a contract is or may become irrevocable. 41 Such
holdings are in direct conflict with the hallmark of the law of wills that
a will is a valid testamentary device only if it remains ambulatory during
the life of the testator.42 It is the contract, and not the will, which affords
an aura of permanence to the beneficiary's rights. Thus, according to
the weight of authority, although a joint or a mutual will executed pur-
suant to a contract not to revoke may be revoked, the rights given a
beneficiary by that will may be asserted under the contract, if it is found
that the contract has taken effect.
In some jurisdictions, the contract is deemed to be formed at the in-
stant of mutual agreement between or among the testators; a bilateral
contract results, and the rights and dunes arising therefrom are fixed
from that moment. The contract thus may be enforced during the joint
lives of the testators.43 Other jurisdictions, however, hold that the con-
40. See, e.g., Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 P. 1065 (1924); Irwin v. First Nat'l
Bank, 212 Ore. 534, 321 P.2d 299 (1958); Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc. v.
Nashville Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629, 202 S.W.2d 178 (1947); Shawver v. Parks, 239 S.W.2d
'188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); G. TioMPsoN, THE LAw OF W sIS 153 (Supp. 1962).
41. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson, 243 IMI. 80, 84-86, 90 N.E. 216, 218 (1909); In re
Estate of Thompson, 206 Kan. 288, 478 P.2d 174 (1970); Underwood v. Myer, 107 W Va.
57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929); B. SPARKS, supra note 1, at 111-15; cf. Garland v. Meyer, 169
S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); W RoLLisoN, THE LAw OF WILLS § 186 (1939).
42. See, e.g., Keith v. Culp, 111 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Baker v.
Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W 998 (1910); First Nat'l Bank v. Friednash, 72 Nev. 237,
302 P.2d 281 (1956); Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315, 319, 87 N.E.2d 275, 276-77
(1949); Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wash. 2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942); Pederson v. First Na'1
Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966); B. SPARKS, supra note 1, at 111; Evans,
supra note 5, at 98; Partridge, The Revocability of Mutual and Reciprocal Wills, 77 U.
PA. L. REv. 357, 360 (1929); Sparks, Application of the Marital Deduction to Joint and
Mutual Wills, 37 Miss. L.J. 226, 230 (1966); 50 MARQ. L. REv. 549, 552 (1967).
43. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thompson, 206 Kan. 288, 478 P.2d 174 (1970); Pederson
v. First Nat' Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d 425 (1966).
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tract is not formed until one testator dies.44 It is reasoned that the ex-
ecution of the will constitutes only an offer by each testator; acceptance
can be accomplished only by the death of one of the testators while his
joint or mutual will is in effect. Acceptance by "performance" indicates
that the resulting contract is unilateral. Under a third approach, it is held
that the contract is not formed until the surviving testator accepts the
gifts made to him in the will of the first to die. The predeceasing testa-
tor's death with his joint or mutual will in effect is viewed as an offer to
contract, the contract is formed upon acceptance of the benefits of the
will by the survivor.45
A. "Revocation" During the Joint Lifetimes of the Testators
The position of a party who seeks to withdraw from an agreement not
to revoke his joint or mutual will is dependent upon the applicable rule
as to time of formation of the contract.46 In jurisdictions where a con-
tract arises only after the death of one testator or after acceptance of
benefits by the survivor, there is, of course, no problem of "revocation"
during the joint lives of the testators. Since the contract does not arise
until after the death of one testator, the agreement is not binding during
their joint lives and thus can be avoided without legal significance. More-
over, even in a jurisdiction which holds that a contract not to revoke
arses immediately upon agreement between the parties, there are several
means by which the binding effect of the contract may be avoided.
A fundamental premise of contract law is that a bilateral contract can-
not be rescinded unilaterally; nevertheless, a number of courts have stated
that during the joint lifetimes of the testators, either party may unilateral-
ly rescind by giving notice to the other testator.47 Although such hold-
44. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 89 N.W.2d 337 (1958); Canada
v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927 (1925).
45. See, e.g., Scofield v. Bethea, 170 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1948); Wimp v. Collett, 414
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
46. For a discussion of the three events which indicate contract formation in the
various jurisdictions, see Comment, Contracts to Make joint or Mutual Wills, 55 MARQ.
L. REv. 103, 108-133 (1972).
47. Many courts have taken the position that mere notice will effectively rescind the
contract. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 84-85, 90 N.E. 216, 218 (1909); Luthy
v. Seaburn, 242 Iowa 184, 46 N.W.2d 44 (1951); In re Farley's Estate, 237 Iowa 1069, 24
N.W.2d 453 (1946); Maurer v. Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102, 274 N.W 99 (1937); Ankeny
v. Lieuallen, 169 Ore. 206, 113 P.2d 1113 (1941) (dictum), aff'd on rehearing, 169 Ore.
206, 127 P.2d 735 (1942); Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc. v. Nashville Trust Co.,
184 Tenn. 629, 202 S.W.2d 178 (1947). See also Boner's Adm'x v. Chesnut's Ex'r, 317
S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky 1958).
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ings give effect to the policy favoring free alienation of property,48 they
clearly are repugnant to basic contract law The same result often could
be accomplished if the courts simply required more exacting evidence
before finding an underlying contract.
Other courts correctly hold that a contract not to revoke joint or
mutual wills can be rescinded only upon the mutual consent of the
parties.49 This rule aligns with traditional contract law in preventing
unilateral rescission of a bilateral contract. Since the formation of a con-
tract not to revoke a joint will or mutual wills requires the mutual con-
sent of both testators, the same mutual consent should be required to
rescind the contract.50
In some jurisdictions, the binding effect of a contract not to revoke
joint or mutual wills may be removed if the testator marries or remarries
subsequent to the execution of a will pursuant to a contract not to re-
voke. If the testator's spouse knew of the contract at the time of the
marriage, the beneficiary may enforce the contract."i In some states the
contract remains binding even though the subsequent spouse had no
knowledge thereof.52 Other jurisdictions, however, have refused to en-
force the contract, at least to the extent of the wife's forced share or
dower rights, if the subsequent spouse was unaware of the contract.53
The subsequent marriage situation should not be confused with the
result under statutory provisions m a number of states whereby a will
automatically is revoked upon the happening of specified events. 4 Among
the events or combination of events which may give rise to a total or
Other courts have stated that notice will rescind the contract only if the co-testator
is given suffcient time to make new testamentary provisions. See, e.g., Allen v. Dillard,
if Wash. 2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942); W RowisoN, TE LAw OF Wuis § 186 (1939).
Both positions are criticized in B. SPARKS, supra note 1, at 114, where it is noted that
most cases containing this statement actually have involved actions by the survivor. Id.
at 121.
48. 50 MARQ. L. REV. 549, 552 (1967).
49. See, e.g., Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934); Stewart v. Todd, 190
Iowa 283, 173 N.W 619 (1919); In re Estate of Thompson, 206 Kan. 288, 478 P.2d 174
(1970) (dissenting opimon); Pederson v. First Nat'l Bank, 31 Wis. 2d 648, 143 N.W.2d
425 (1966); D. REMSEN, Tim PREPARATION OF WILTS AND TRusTs ch. II, S 6 (2d ed. 1930);
B. SPARKs, supra note 1, at 111, 114.
50. See Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W 619 (1919); 17 AM. JuR. 2d Con-
tracts § 490 (1964); 5A A. CoRBi, COR-nN ONt CONTRACTS § 1236 (1964).
51. 1 PAGE ON WILLs, supra note 9, § 10.24. Contra, Boner's Adm'x v. Chesnut's Ex'r,
317 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1958).
52. 1 PAGE ON WMu.s, supra note 9, § 10.24.
53. Id., B. SPARKS, supra note 1, at 199.
54. See generally Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 880-90 (1960).
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partial revocation of a will are the birth of a child,55 marriage and birth
of issue,56 divorce, 57 and remarriage. 5 Those states which have considered
the effect of such statutes upon joint or mutual wills executed pursuant
to a contract not to revoke generally have held that although the speci-
fied event may revoke the will, it has no effect upon the underlying con-
tract.5 9
B. Revocatwn After the Death of the First Testator
In jurisdictions where a contract not to revoke joint or mutual wills
is deemed to be formed upon the death of the first testator, both parties
are free to withdraw from their agreement prior to that event in ac-
cordance with the contract rule that an offer to contract may be re-
voked at any time until accepted. 61 Withdrawal from the agreement re-
quires notice to other parties, since revocation of an offer is not effective
until notice is received by the offeree. 1
Similarly, either party may withdraw from the agreement during the
joint lifetimes of the testators in jurisdictions in which contracts not to
revoke are not deemed formed until acceptance by the survivor of bene-
fits under the will of the predeceased testator. Moreover, in such juris-
dictions, the survivor may withdraw during the period between the
death of the first testator and the time at which the benefits of the first
testator's will become available for his acceptance. Although it has been
55. After-born children are provided for in most states by statutes which permit them
to take their intestate shares. Id. at 881-82. A few statutes provide that if an after-born
child survives the testator, the will is revoked. Id.
56. This combination of events is provided for by statute in a minority of states, and
the effect of such statutes varies greatly Id. at 884-85.
57. As of 1960, fourteen states had legislation under which a testator's divorce affected
his will. In only two of those states did the legislation mandate total revocation. Id.
at 885-86.
58. The statutes vary greatly as to the effect of remarriage on the testator's prior will.
Id. at 882-84.
59. Lewis v Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 P 421 (1919); Boner's Adm'x v. Chesnut's Ex'r,
317 S.W.2d 867 (Ky 1958); Schomp v. Brown, 215 Ore. 714, 335 P.2d 847, c!arified on
denial of rehearing, 215 Ore. 714, 337 P.2d 358 (1959) (holding the will revoked on
testator's remarriage, but the underlying contract irrevocable if the survivor accepts the
benefits); Irwin v. First Nat'l Bank, 212 Ore. 534, 321 P.2d 299 (1958); Underwood v.
Myer, 107 W Va. 57, 59-60, 146 S.E. 896, 897 (1929) ("[Rleciprocal agreement became
a fixed obligation upon the death of [the husband] and the acceptance by the [wife] of
the testamentary benefits accruing to her from that arrangement."); B. SPARIKS, sUpra
note 1, at 176; Evans, supra note 5, at 99.
60. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); Lally v. Cronen, 247
N.Y. 58, 159 N.E. 723 (1928).
61. RESTATaMENT oF CoNn.ACTs § 41 (1932). See Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky 394, 285
S.W 188 (1926).
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suggested only infrequently that a survivor might avoid his contractual
obligations by declining to accept the benefits of the first testator's will,
a rule that no contract is formed until the surviving testator accepts
such benefits raises an inference that if there is no acceptance of bene-
fits, there is no contract. In Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs,62 it was held
that a contract not to revoke became binding "after the survivor ratified
the will by having it probated, and then accepted and enjoyed the bene-
fits derived from its provisions "The court, however, noted: "It may
be conceded that after the death of one it might have been revoked
by the survivor before she accepted the benefits which the will con-
ferred." 63
Thus, it would appear that in jurisdictions which place contract forma-
tion at the acceptance of benefits stage, a surviving testator has the option
of taking under the predeceased testator's will with resulting contract
obligations or of renouncing the will, thus preventing the formation of
the contract. The latter choice may be attractive to survivors who quali-
fy to receive a share in the estate under common law rules of dower,
curtesy, or homestead allowance, or under statutes of similar effect.64
Furthermore, if the survivor owned property jointly with the prede-
ceased testator, he may elect to succeed to full ownership by his right
of survivorship, independently of any devise of such property to him.6
On the other hand, a survivor's withdrawal from the contract by refusal
to accept the benefits of the other testator's will may result from -a
simple desire to deny to third parties the gifts they were to have re-
ceived under the terms of the contract or from a desire to make provision
for third parties not contemplated by the contract.
It is submitted that since a testator who dies with a joint or mutual
will in force departs life in the belief that he has provided for the sur-
viving testator and through hmi for some ultimate third-party benefi-
62. 219 S.W 839, 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
63. Id.
64. The UNIwoRm PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 2, provides for a surviving spouse by means
of an elective share in lieu of dower or curtesy Provision is made for a homestead al-
lowance in section 2-401 and for exempt property in section 2-402.
65. Where husband and wife owned a parcel of real estate as tenants by the entirety,
it was held that even though the parcel was the subject of their joint will, the wife, as
survivor, could dispose of the property unfettered by the joint agreement. Levenson v.
Levenson, 229 App. Div 402, 242 N.Y.S. 165 (1930). Similarly, where a joint will ex-
ecuted by a husband and wife pursuant to a contract disposed of real estate owned by
them in joint tenancy, the husband did not offer the joint will for probate after the
wife's death but asserted his right of survivorship as the property In re Estate of
Hoeppner, 32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754 (1966).
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ciaries, a rule which permits a survivor's option may result in frustration
of the predeceased party's testamentary purpose. It may be for this rea-
son that it has been suggested so infrequently that the survivor may side-
step the contract by declining the benefits.6 6 A surviving party should
not be able to withdraw from the bargain after it is too late for the de-
ceased party to readjust his testamentary dispositions.
C. Advantages, Disadvantages, Recommendations
In general, the earlier a contract not to revoke is deemed to be formed,
the more certain it is that the property involved will pass in accordance
with the agreement between the parties. If the agreement not to revoke
a joint or mutual will is made in a jurisdiction whose courts will hold a
contract to have been formed at the moment of agreement, each party
can rest in relative assurance that there can be no deviation from the terms
of the agreement except with his consent.6 7 If, however, the contract is
not deemed formed until death of a party to the agreement, each party
remains free to withdraw from the agreement during the joint lifetimes
of the parties. Finally, in jurisdictions in which the contract is not deemed
formed until the survivor's acceptance of the benefits of a deceased
party's will, it would appear that there is no assurance that the agree-
ment will be carried out, since the survivor may at his option avoid the
contract by declining to accept the benefits accruing to him under the
predeceased testator's will.
If the purpose of contracts not to revoke joint or mutual wills is to
create inter vivos certainty as to the testamentary dispositions of parties
thereto, that purpose would be best served by a rule that a contract is
formed at the time of the parties' agreement. There are, however, sig-
nficant considerations which militate against such a rule. Parties to an
agreement not to revoke joint or mutual wills may live long after the
agreement is reached, during which tme the situation of the parties could
change drastically If a contract is deemed to have been formed at the
moment of their agreement, no party could effect a modification of the
66. Apart from Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S.W 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920),
the argument was found in only one other case, wherein it was rejected. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in affirming the rule that "it is the duty of equity to grant such
relief where, as here, the survivor of the two testators to a joint will or to two mutually
reciprocal wills, has directly benefitted," stated that such a rule "does not necessitate
our concurrence in respondent's argument for the converse: 'Equity will not grant relief
if the survivor does not receive property under the contract."' In re Estate of Hoeppner,
32 Wis. 2d 339, 145 N.W.2d 754, 758 (1966).
67. Note, however, the minority rule that a party may unilaterally rescind the contract.
See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
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agreement without the consent of the other party or parties. The result
could be highly mequitable if one party reaps advantage from the un-
proved situation of another. Moreover, the existence of rules protecting,
the interests of third-party beneficiaries to contracts may, in many in-
stances, prevent alteration or rescission of a contract not to revoke joint
or mutual wills, even with the concurrence of principals thereto, unless.
parties who would take legacies or devises at the death of the surviving
principal also give their consent to the alteration or rescission.6 1 Finally,
a contract not to revoke joint or mutual wills represents a cloud on the
tide of all property which is the subject of the contract. Transfer of an
absolute interest in such property requires that all parties join in the con-
veyance.
All of these factors could give rise to situations in which the existence
of a contract not to revoke could prove burdensome to the parties to the
contract. To prevent such consequences, the time at which a contract
is deemed formed arguably should be postponed. However, to delay the
time of formation until the survivor's acceptance of benefits may be no
more desirable in light of the opportunity provided the survivor to undo
the entire agreement after a deceased testator has fully performed his
part thereof. It would thus appear that a rule placing the time of contract
formation at the death of one of the parties would be preferable. Under
such a rule, the parties would be free to alter their dispositions during
their joint lives to reflect changed circumstances. In addition, each party
could rest in the certainty that, should he be the first to die, the agree-
ment for which he bargained would be carried out.69
68. For a discussion of third-party beneficiary rules applicable to joint and mutual
will contracts in Wisconsin, see Comment, Contracts to Make Joint or Mlutual Wills, 55
MAItQ. L. REv. 103, 115-16 (1972).
69. A rule requiring a party wishing to withdraw from the agreement during the
joint lifetimes of the parties to notify the other parties before the withdrawal is
effective in most cases and provides ample opportumty for the other parties to adjust them
testamentary plans. There is, however, the possibility that one .of the parties, while on
his deathbed, could receive notice of another's withdrawal from the agreement and be
incapable of effecting appropriate changes in his own testamentary dispositions. To pro-
tect against this contingency, the notification rule could be modified so as to render
ineffective any notice of withdrawal received by a party within a specified period prior
to his own death.
The Uniform Code is silent as to the power of testators to withdraw from agreements
not to revoke joint or mutual wills. A suggested addition to Article 1I, Part 7, dealing
with "Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death," is as follows:
Section 2-702. [Withdrawal from Agreement not to Revoke a Joint Will or
Mutual Wills.]
Any party to an agreement not to revoke a joint will or mutual wills may
withdraw from the agreement during the joint lifetimes of parties thereto
1973]
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III. AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
"After-acquired property," a term embracing all of the property to
which a testator becomes entitled between the time of execution of his
will and his death, is a familiar topic in the law of wills and estates.70
Statutes in most jurisdictions provide that after-acquired property may
pass under such terms of a will as it would pass had it been owned at the
time of the making of the will.71 These statutes, however, are not uni-
form as to the effect of a testator's intent. Some statutes provide that
after-acquired property may pass under a will only where there is clear
indication in that will that the testator so intended.7 2 Other statutes per-
nut after-acquired property to pass under a will in the absence of a con-
trary intention appearing in the will.73 The Uniform Probate Code is in
accord with the latter class of statutes.74
As applied to joint or mutual wills, the term "after-acquired property"
could refer to property acquired by the survivor of the parties to a
upon notification to the other parties of his action, except that such notice
shall be meffectve against a party by whom such notice is received within
30 days of his death or legal incapacitation.
Comment
Three different rules are in effect in various jurisdictions governing unilateral
withdrawal from a joint or mutual will agreement. A contractual obliga-
tion not to revoke a joint or mutual will is said to arise either at the instant
of agreement between or among the parties, or at the death of the first
party with his agreed-upon will in force, or upon the acceptance of the
benefits of the predeceasing party's will by the surviving party The rule
adopted is a compromise which permits parties to adjust their testamentary
dispositions to changed circumstances during their joint lifetimes but which
also assures each party that, should he be the first to die, the agreement win
be carried out. The 30-day provision protects a party in his last illness or
during a physical or mental incapacity against a bad faith withdrawal.
70. See generally 4 PAGE oN WiLLs, supra note 9, § 33.20; Annot., 75 AL.R. 474 (1931).
71. The first such statute probably was the English Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I
Vict. c. 26.
72. E.g., Mic. Comp. LAws ANN. § 702.3 (1948):
Any estate, right or interest in lands acquired by the testator after the mak-
mg of his will, shall pass thereby in like manner as if possessed at the time
of making the will, if such shall manifestly appear by the will to have been
the intention of the testator.
73. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-9 (1951):
Real property acquired by a testator after making his will shall pass by any
general or special devise or sale under any power of sale contained in the
will sufficient to include such real property, had the same been acquired
before the making of the will, unless a contrary intention appear on the
face of the will.
74. Section 2-604 should be read in conjunction with section 2-603.
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joint or mutual will agreement after the death of another party as well
as to property acquired after execution of the will or wills. To distinguish
these two concepts for the purposes of this Note, the term "after-ac-
quired property" will be restricted to property acquired after execution
of a will but prior to the death of a party; the property acquired by the
surviving testator after the death of another party to a joint or mutual
will arrangement will be termed "postmortem assets."
Statutory provisions relating to after-acquired property take effect
only after a testator's death when disposition is being made of the proper-
ty he acquired between the execution of his will and hs death. The stat-
utes do not govern the right of a surviving testator to dispose of post-
mortem assets during his lifetime. This distinction, however, is not always
recognized 75
A. The Rule of Murphy v. Slaton
Legislative formulation of probate law has left open the question of
the surviving testator's rights and duties with respect to postmortem
assets. Moreover, since joint or mutual will agreements frequently make
express provision for postmortem assets, 6 courts rarely have been com-
pelled to consider the question 7 There are, however, instances in which
no such express provision has been made38
The leading decision concerning the disposition of a survivor's post-
mortem assets was rendered by the Supreme Court of Texas in Murphy
v. Slaton.79 There it was held:
75. See, e.g., In re Schefe's Estate, 261 Wis. 113, 52 N.W.2d 375 (i952) (dissenting
opimon).
76. An example of such a provision is found in the will litigated in Menke v. Duwe,
117 Kan. 207, 230 P. 1065, 1072 (1924) (emphasis supplied).
If my wife does not survive after my death, in that event I give, devise
and bequeath all the property owned by me at the tie of my death to the
same persons to whom I have bequeathed and devised the same in case my
wife first takes a life estate in my property
77. The court in Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35, 273 S.W.2d 588, 594 (1954), stated
that no case directly in point had been cited.
78. The joint will litigated in Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210
(19i5), for example, gave no guidance as to the disposition of property acquired by the
survivor:
Second. We give unto the survivor of either of us, the income of our real
and personal property, during his or her natural life for his or her own use
and benefit. Third. After the death of the survivor of either of us, all our
property, both real and personal, shall be divided in the manner follow-
ing
79. 154 Tex. 35, 273 S.W.2d 588 (i954).
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While the question is not free from difficulty, and we recognize
that the makers of a joint and mutual will, or of mutual wills, have
the right and power to provide that all of the property owned by
the survivor at his death shall pass under and be bound by the terms
of their will, we do not believe such effect should be given to
mutual wills unless the intention to do so is set forth in the will by
very plain, specific and unambiguous language. In the absence of
such clearly expressed intention we feel that the better reasoning
supports the rule that [postmortem assets] owned by the survivor
in his or her individual right [do] not pass.80
The rule has been affirmed repeatedly in Texas." Outside that jurisdic-
non, however, the question does not appear to have been litigated to
any notable extent; 2 Corpus Juris Secundum, for example, states the rule
of Murphy v. Slaton but cites only Texas cases in support."3
B. Suggested Rationale for the Rule of Murphy v Slaton
It is not clear what constitutes the "better reasoning" to which the
court alludes in Murphy v. Slaton.8 4 The substantiality of the issue would
seem to have required an elucidation of the reasoning underlying the de-
cision, especially since the issue was one of first impression in Texas. 85
However, the only language in the opimon which provides any insight
into the court's reasoning is the following poorly worded statement:
To construe the estate disposed of by the will to be all the property
owned by the survivor at his or her death would be to make an im-
possible and intolerable situation. The survivor could not enjoy
his own estate after such survivor [sic] had died.88
A rationale to support the rule of Murphy v. Slaton may be found in
an examination of the possible mtentions of the parties to the contract.8 7
In entering into an arrangement involving joint or mutual wills, a testa-
80. 273 S.W.2d at 595 (emphasis supplied).
81. Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957); Martinez v Pearson,
373 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
82. A California decision recognizing the rule of Murphy v. Slaton is Brewer v.
Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 349 P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1960)
83. 96 CJ.S. Wills § 756(a) (1957).
84. See quote in text accompanying note 80 supra.
85. See note 77 supra.
86. 273 S.W.2d at 594.
87. See generally 4 PAGE o N WiLLs, supra note 9, § 33.20.
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tor's intention may be to provide for the co-testator and third parties, not
simultaneously, but as successive beneficiaries. If a testator desired simply
to divide his property among his co-testator and third parties, no con-
tractual arrangement would be necessary; a simple will would suffice. A
joint or mutual will agreement assures the testator that, should he be the
first to die, his property will pass into the hands of the surviving testator
and then to third parties in accordance with the contractual agreement.
In order to give effect to this intention, it would not appear essential that
the survivor's postmortem assets also be given over to the third parties.
The motivation of a testator in entering into a joint or mutual will
agreement may be to ensure not only that his own property will reach
ultimate beneficiaries but also that the property of the co-testator will
devolve to him, should he survive the co-testator, or to third parties,
should he predecease the co-testator. If the aim of the testator is to obtain
the co-testator's property for himself in the event that he survives the
co-testator, it would be inappropriate, in the event that the testator did
not survive, to require that the co-testator's postmortem assets be held
for the benefit of third parties. If, however, the testator's intention is to
ensure that property of the co-testator will pass to ultimate beneficiaries
even if the co-testator survives him, then there are grounds for holding
that postmortem assets of the surviving co-testator pass under the terms
of the joint or mutual will in accordance with the predeceased testator's
intention, a result contrary to the rule of Murphy v. Slaton.
Thus, there are four basic reasons for which a testator might enter into
a joint or mutual will agreement: to ensure that his property will pass
to the co-testator, that property of the co-testator will pass to him, that
his property will pass to ultimate beneficiaries, or that property of the
co-testator will pass to ultimate beneficiaries. The first intention can be
fulfilled only if the testator predeceases his co-testator, whereas the sec-
ond intention can be fulfilled only if the testator survives his co-testator.
The third and fourth intentions can be carried out regardless of who
dies first, but the testator is concerned only with the possibility that he
will be the first to die, since, if he knew that he would survive, he could
provide directly for the ultimate beneficiaries. Thus, the fulfillment of
the various possible intentions is dependent upon which party dies first.
Since, however, the testator does not know at the time of entering into
a joint or mutual will agreement which party that is to be, and because
there is nothing mutually exclusive about the intentions, it is possible that
each such intention forms part of the motivation for making the agree-
ment.
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If, in the absence of any intention expressed in the will or contract, a
judicial rule must govern the disposition of property acquired by the
survivor of the makers of a joint or mutual will agreement after the
death of one party, such a rule should comport with the apparent inten-
tions of the parties to the agreement. Only the assumed intention of en-
suring that property of a co-testator will pass to ultimate beneficiaries
affords any logical basis for a requirement that the survivor's postmortem
assets must pass under his joint or mutual will. It would be consistent
with the other possible motivations, however, to permit the survivor to
dispose of postmortem assets as he sees fit. A simple weighing of the
possible reasons for which testators may enter into joint or mutual will
agreements suggests that the testator's motivations will have related pn-
cipally to his property and that of the co-testator owned during their
joint lifetimes rather than to the property acquired by one of them after
the death of the other. Accordingly, a balance should be struck in favor
of a rule which gives a survivor complete freedom to dispose of his post-
mortem assets unrestricted by the provisions of a joint or mutual will-
the rule of Murphy v. Slaton.
The foregoing reasoning is, of course, to some degree speculative. It
should be noted, however, that where the problem of postmortem assets
arises, a court will be without the benefit of controlling indicia in the
contract or in the will and will have no guidance from statutes. Under
such circumstances, its decision must be founded solely upon a policy of
giving expression to what it believes to be the intentions of testators gen-
erally 8
Another, although more generalized, argument in support of the rule
of Murphy v. Slaton derives from property law Since the surviving
testator may live long after the death of the first testator, during which
time he may acquire a considerable amount of property, any restrictions
on his right of alienation should be imposed by operation of law only
for compelling reasons, for it is well established that the law disfavors
such restraints.8 9 Thus, when parties to a joint or mutual will agreement
88. Cf. UaNoRMa PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 1, General Comment: "The Code attempts
to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition of his property at
death, and for this purpose the prevailing patterns in wills are useful in determining
what the owner who fails to execute a will would probably want." This approach could
be adapted to the situation where testators fail to make disposition of postmortem assets
by contract or joint or mutual wills executed pursuant thereto. Cf. 1 PAGE ON WMILS,
supra note 9, § 1.i.
89. Restraints upon alienation may, for example, keep property out of commerce,
concentrate wealth, prevent improvement of realty, and work a hardship upon creditors.
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have not expressed an intention that a survivor's postmortem assets are
to devolve according to the provisions of the joint or mutual will and
no other compelling considerations are present, public policy weighs
against imposition of such a burden upon the survivor."
In conclusion, it is submitted that the rule of Murphy v. Slaton merits
inclusion in statutes dealing with probate, particularly the Uniform Pro-
bate Code. The rule might be placed in either the portion of the Code
dealing with "Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death"91 or in the
section setting forth "Rules of Construction," 92 but would be best lo-
cated immediately following the section pertaining to after-acquired
property in order to call attention to the distinction between after-ac-
quired property and postmortem assets.93
IV ANTI-LAPSE STATUTES
Anti-lapse statutes have been enacted to alter the common law doc-
trine94 that a testamentary gift will fail, or lapse, if an intended legatee
or devisee predeceases a testator 95 whose will makes no provision for
passing the legacy or devise to the predeceasing legatee's legal repre-
sentative, heirs, or next of kin 96 or to a substitute beneficiary97 Under an
Schnebly, Restramts Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE LJ. 961, 964 (1935).
See J. GaY, REmANers oN TmH ALIENATiON oF PaoPTY § 4 (2d ed. 1895).
90. J. GRAY, supra note 89, § 3.
91. UNFoaRm PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 7.
92. Id. art. II, pt. 6.
93. Id. § 2-604. A suggested wording for the rule is as follows:
[Construction That Contract to Leave Joint Will or Mutual Will Ihap-
plicable to Postmortem Assets] Neither a contract to leave a joint will or
mutual wills nor a will executed pursuant thereto is to be construed to affect
property rights acquired by the survivor of the parties to the contract
after the death of the other parties. The provisions of Section 2-603 apply-
ing to this construction shall be deemed to include a contrary intention in-
dicated by the contract.
Comment
This section does not alter the surviving testator's rights in the case of
joint or mutual wills not executed pursuant to a contract, since the surviving
testator is free to revoke such a will and, in no event, is bound by the will
to any particular disposition of his postmortem assets.
The term postmortem assets is used to designate property rights acquired
by the surviving testator in a joint or mutual will context after the death(s)
of the co-testator (s)
94. See 6 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 9, § 50.10.
95. Id. § 50.2.
96. Id. § 50.14.
97. Id. § 50.8. The common law provided that a lapsed legacy would pass under an
applicable residuary clause. Since, however, at common law after-acquired realty could
not be devised, a lapsed devise would pass, not under a residuary clause, but by intestacy.
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ann-lapse statute, the gift which otherwise would fail is treated as though
the testator had, in fact, made some provision for passing it to other
parties in the event the intended beneficiary predeceased the testator.
Frequently, the gift is passed directly to the issue9" or descendants99 of
the intended beneficiary
Numerous purposes have been ascribed to the enactment of ann-lapse
statutes. Such statutes have been said to give effect to a presumption that
the testator would have made provision for the relatives of the intended
beneficiary if he had foreseen the possibility of lapse.110 One court has
stated the purpose as being "to substitute the natural objects of the testa-
tor's bounty" for the predeceased legatee. 101 Moreover, ann-lapse statutes
are viewed as preserving the otherwise lapsed gift for persons who pre-
sumably would have enjoyed the gift if the intended beneficiary had
died immediately after the testator.10 2 Finally, such statutes accord with
the policy which disfavors intestacy, it being considered more equitable
that the gift should pass to the relatives of the intended beneficiary than
to the testator's heirs.103
Application of generally worded anti-lapse statutes to joint or mutual
wills occasionally causes problems not encountered elsewhere. In an Iowa
case,104 for example, a husband and wife executed mutual wills with
reciprocal provisions but made no provisions for third parties.10 5 The
Id. § 50.16. Of course, if there were no applicable residuary clause, a lapsed legacy also
would pass by intestacy Id. § 50.15.
98. E.g., MAss. GEN'L LAws Am. ch. 191, § 22 (1958)-
If a deviseor legacy is made to a child or other relation of the testator, who
dies before the testator but leaves issue surviving the testator, such issue shall,
unless a different disposition is made or required by the will, take the same
estate which the person whose issue they are would have taken if he had
survived the testator.
99. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-133 (1955)"
When a testator devises or bequeaths an estate or interest to a child or other
descendant, and such devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the testa-
tor, leaving descendants surviving the testator, the devise or legacy shall not
lapse by reason of such death, but the estate so devised or bequeathed shall
vest in the descendants of the legatee or devisee as though he had survived
the testator and died intestate.
100. See, e.g., Weiss v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 204 Tenn. 563, 322 S.W.2d 427 (1959)
101. Kling v. Goodman, 236 Ala. 297, 181 So. 745 (1938).
102. See, e.g., In re McCarthy's Estate, 256 Iowa 66, 126 N.W.2d 357 (1964)
103. See, e.g., In re Burns' Estate, 78 S.D. 223, 100 N.W.2d 399 (1960)
104. In re Croulek's Estate, 252 Iowa 700, 107 N.W.2d 77 (1961).
105. In the discussion which follows, wills described as being without provisions for
third parties will connote those making no provision for a testamentary disposition to
be made by the survivor of the parties to the agreement in favor of ultimate beneficiaries.
If there were a provision for third parties, it would supersede a provision favoring one
[Vol. 15 144
CONTRACTS NOT Tor REVOKE
husband died, and the wife took under his will. At the wife's death;
however, heirs of the husband claimed that under the Iowa ann-lapse
statute,10 6 property which was the subject of the reciprocal provisions
made by the wife in behalf of the husband passed to the husband's heirs.
Citing previous decisions,10 7 the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that the anti-lapse statute was designed to have such an effect. The
court held that if mutual wills contain no provisions for third parties, the
will of the -first to die constitutes a single will (of the first to die) and has
no further existence as the will of the survivor." 8 Although the court
did not articulate the basis for this portion of its holding, other Iowa de-
cisions have clarified the reasoning underpinning the rule. In Anderson
v. Anderson,'09 for instance, the court noted that the reciprocal provi-
sions of joint or mutual wills which operate to transfer the estate of one
testator to another are necessarily conditioned upon the survival of the
testator who is to take the estate of the other. No property passes under
a joint or mutual will until one testator dies; the property passes to the
testator who surmves the other. From these observations, the court con-
cluded that at the death of a surviving testator, there can be no lapse of
the provisions originally made in the survivor's will in behalf of the pre-
deceasing testator, since the predeceasing testator never qualified, by
outliving his co-testator, to take under those provisions." 0
It may appear to be mere formalism to require that one testator must
survive the other in order to take under a joint or mutual will; how-
ever, such a requirement must be implied, if it is not expressly stated, in
order to preclude the operation of an anti-lapse statute in cases where
there is no gift over to third parties. Otherwise, if mutual wills were
drafted in which each testator named the other as recipient of his estate
without making any mention of the necessity of the other's surviving
him," an anti-lapse statute would operate to pass the surviving testator's
of the parties to the contract upon the testator's death and thereby preclude operation
of an anti-lapse statute.
106. IowA CoDE ANN. § 633.16 (1958).
107. Maloney v. Rose, 224 Iowa 1071, 1074, 277 N.W 572, 574 (1938); Maurer v.
Johanson, 223 Iowa 1102, 1105, 274 N.W 99, 101 (1937).
108. Accord, Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky 394, 285 S.W 188 (1926); Rogers v. Mosier,
121 Okla. 213, 245 P. 36 (1926); Wilson v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S.E. 539 (1935).
109. 181 Iowa 578, 164N.W 1042 (1917).
110. 164N.W at 1045.
111. A joint will speaks for two or more testators. Its reciprocal provisions can identify
a beneficiary only as a survivor or through the use of a term having that effect. A mtftual
will, however, speaks for one testator and may identify a. beneficiary by name. with the
understanding that such beneficiary takes at the testators death, no mention being made
of survival.
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property to issue or descendants of the predeceasing testator at the sur-
vivor's death. Thus, for example, spinster sisters could execute mutual
wills with reciprocal provisions in favor of each other but with no ex-
press requirements that the beneficiary must survive the testatrix and
no provisions for third parties. Upon the death of one sister, the other
would succeed to her estate and could, for instance, marry and live for
a considerable time thereafter. Thinking that her mutual will in favor of
the deceased sister was no longer effective, the surviving sister might die
in the belief that her estate would pass to her husband by intestacy A
third sister, however, could offer the surviving sister's mutual will for
probate, claiming that by reason of the anti-lapse statute, she, as the pre-
deceased sister's nearest living relative, should take the estate devised to
the predeceased sister. If there is no implication that the surviving sister
intended to condition her will upon her co-testatrix's survival, this posi-
non would appear correct.
Although an identical result might ensue if the surviving sister's will
had been a simple rather than a mutual will, it is submitted that the pre-
sumptions underlying anti-lapse statutes, which may be justified in the
case of a simple will, are not supported by the intentions of a party to a
mutual will. The testator who executes a simple will ordinarily does so
with the intention of providing for parties who probably will outlive him.
If, however, the beneficiary does not survive the testator, an anti-lapse
statute operates on the presumption that the testator would desire to have
the property pass to the relatives of the deceased beneficiary rather than
by intestacy On the other hand, a testator who executes a mutual will
with reciprocal provisions usually does so, at least in part, to secure for
himself the reciprocal provisions made in his behalf by the co-testator;
indeed, when there are no provisions for third parties, it is difficult to
infer any other compelling motvation. The presumptive basis of an anti-
lapse statute is of questionable validity in such a case, since it would ap-
pear that the mutual will of the survivor of the testators has served its
purpose once the survivor takes under the mutual will of the first to die.
There does not appear to be any basis for a presumption that the survivor
would desire that at his own death, the property received from the co-
testator should return to relatives of the predeceased testator.
Thus, every mutual will should be deemed to contain the implied con-
dition that a party shall not qualify to take under its reciprocal provisions
except by his surviving the testator. Placing reciprocal provisions on this
contingent basis eliminates the possibility of lapse, since either the in-
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tended beneficiary will survive the testator and take under such provi-
sions or the intended beneficiary will predecease the testator and his ex-
pectancy will never vest."2
V ENFORCEMENT
As noted earlier,"13 most courts recognize that the obligations created
by the contractual features of a joint or mutual will are distinct from
those which arise out of the testamentary dispositions"14 and that a joint
or mutual will executed pursuant to a contract remains ambulatory and
may be revoked at any time, even after the death of one of the parties
to the contract." 5 While the parties to a joint or mutual will agreement
are living, any violation of an agreement to leave joint or mutual wills
may be redressed, if at all, only as a breach of contract. The testamentary
provisions of the will or wills executed pursuant to the agreement afford
no grounds for relief, since no will, in and of itself, creates a vested in-
terest in an intended beneficiary while the testator lives."16
After the death of one of the parties to the agreement, the dual ex-
istence of contract and will complicates the situation when redress is
sought for a violation of the agreement. By way of illustration, assume
that two testators agree to leave mutual wills" 7 containing reciprocal
112. It should be noted that not every testamentary disposition is prevented from
lapsing by an anti-lapse statute. Many statutes restrict their application to gifts made
to specified categories of beneficiaries. For example, some statutes do not prevent lapse
of gifts made to beneficiaries who are not relatives. See note 98 supra. Others prevent
lapse of only those gifts made to descendants. See note 99 supra. The anti-lapse provision
of the Uniform Probate Code applies only to gifts made to a grandparent or lineal
descendant of a grandparent-rn other words, a near blood relative. UNIFoaM PROBATE
Coue § 2-605.
Hence, in the typical husband-wife mutual will contaning no gift over to a third party,
the lapsed provisions of the survivor's will would not be affected by a statute which
applies only to gifts made to descendants or blood relatives. In the illustration in the
text involving sisters, however, any anti-lapse statute, other than those limited in applica-
tion to gifts to children or descendants, would operate.
113. See notes 40-42 supra & accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Florey v. Meeker, 194 Ore. 257, 240 P.2d 1177 (1952) ("[Tlhe ap-
pellants have confused the contractual elements of the will and the law relating thereto
with the testamentary elements of the will and the law appropriate to testamentary dis-
position").
115. See, e.g., Collord v. Cooley, 92,Idaho 789, 451 P.2d 535 (1969); Wimp v. Collett,
414 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); Olive v. Biggs, 276 N.C. 445, 173 S.E.2d 301 (1970); Tips v.
Yancey, 431 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1968).
116. In re Kent's Estate, 22 Misc. 2d 66, 194 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1959).
117. The illustration would be equally valid were a joint will postulated.
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provisions and providing for a gift over to A at the death of the survivor
and that the agreement meets all requirements for a valid will. At the
time, if not sooner, that the surviving testator probates the will of the
predeceasing testator and accepts the benefits of the reciprocal provisions
made in his behalf, all jurisdictions would hold that a contract is formed.
Assume that at the survivor's death, A, the ultimate beneficiary under
the mutual wills, offers the survivor's mutual will for probate, but B ap-
pears and propounds a later will of the survivor naming B to receive all
of the survivor's estate.
The familiar rule that a later inconsistent will revokes an earlier will
to the extent of the inconsistency 1 s applies as well to wills of a contrac-
tual nature.'19 A probate court will admit only the later will, 2 even
though that will revokes an earlier will executed pursuant to a contract
not to revoke.' 21 Since the subject matter jurisdiction of the probate
courts of most states extends only to establishment of the validity of a
will as the last will of a testator, 2 2 a probate court has no authority to
address the issue of testamentary dispositions which a testator may have
contracted to make or to leave in force.128 Thus, in the illustration, the
will in favor of B will be probated and the survivor's estate will pass into
his hands.
Although the inchoate rights of A as beneficiary under the mutual will
are entirely abrogated by probate of the survivor's subsequent will, the
contractual obligations embodied in the mutual will cannot be set aside
by probate of the subsequent will. As a beneficiary of the contract not
to revoke, A retains the rights conferred upon him by the third party
beneficiary doctrine of contract law 124 The survivor's failure to leave
in force the testamentary disposition in favor of A pursuant to his agree-
ment with the predeceased testator constitutes a breach of contract for
118. E.g., Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 74 N.M. 69, 390 P.2d 657 (1964); In re
Franey's Estate, 436 Pa. 94, 257 A.2d 515 (1969).
119. E.g., In re Middaugh's Estate, 179 Neb. 25, 136 N.W.2d 217 (1965); In re Stringer's
Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 345 P.2d 786 (1959)
120. See, e.g., In re Campbell's Estate, 46 Wash. 2d 292, 280 P.2d 686 (1955).
121. See, e.g., Bee v. Smith, 6 Cal. App. 3d 521, 86 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1970); Hoff v. Arm-
bruster, 122 Colo. 563, 226 P.2d 312 (1950); In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
(1961).
122. 3 PAGE ON WILLs, supra note 9, §§ 26.142, 26.79.
123. In re Lorto' Will, 23 111. 2d 344, 178 N.E.2d 298 (1961); In re Middaugh's Estate,
179 Neb. 25, 136 N.W.2d 217 (1965).
124. See RmrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoN'RAcrs § 135 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
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which A may seek the usual contract remedies at law or in equity Dam-
ages may be obtained in an action at law;125 however, difficulties in valu-
ation of the estate may require an accounting in equity 126 Thus, equit-
able remedies are more frequently sought in the first instance12 7 Relief
is generally granted in the form of specific performance 28 or by imposi-
tion of a trust upon the survivor's estate. 29
Where both a will and a valid contract are involved, it is clear that the
contract must ultimately prevail. Generally, however, the supremacy
of the contract will not be established until the will has been probated,
whereupon that instrument gains temporary ascendancy The mcapacity
of a probate court to decide anything beyond the validity of a will, and
the consequent necessity of resort to a court of general jurisdiction to
determine contract rights, is a situation remimscent of the classical dis-
tinction between law and equity The necessity of entering separate
courts to secure probate of a will and to enforce a contract to leave a
will has been attacked frequently i30 For example, Chief Judge Cardozo,
referring to the narrowness of probate jurisdiction in New York, ob-
served that to "remit the claimant to another forum after all these ad-
vances and retreats, these reconnaissances, and skirmishes, would be a
postponement of justice equivalent to a denial. If anything is due him,
he should get it in the forum whose aid he has invoked." 1
No state has yet vested its probate courts with power to set aside a last
will or some of its provisions in favor of a contractual order of disposi-
125. In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1961) (dictum); Schomp v. Brown,
215 Ore. 714, 335 P.2d 847, clarified on denial of rebeatn-g, 215 Ore. 714, 337 P.2d 358
(1959).
126. B. SPAnKs, supra note 1, at 136-37
127. Id. at 146.
128. E.g., Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Leaptrot, 225 Ga. 783, 171 S.E.2d 555
(1969); Turner v. Theiss, 129 W Va. 23, 38 S.E.2d 369 (1946).
129. E.g., Tooker v. Vreeland, 92 N.J. Eq. 340, 112 A. 665, aff'd per curtam sub nom.
Tooker v. Maple, 93 N.J. Eq. 224, 115 A. 255 (1921); Underwood v. Myer, 107 W Va.
57, 146 S.E. 896 (1929).
130. See, e.g., Goddard, Mutual Wills, 17 MxcH. L. Rnv. 677, 686 (1919) (footnotes
omitted):
Why send the party out of the probate court into equity when he has a will
that equity will protect as a compact? If the will cannot be revoked, why
not probate it, and refuse probate to the later instrument? Why should
not the law say, when a testator has legally agreed not to make another
will, that that will is his last will, and the one to be probated, and no other
is his will?
131. Raymond v. Davis' Estate, 248 N.Y. 67, 72, 161 N.E. 421,423 (1928).
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non.1 2 In addition to an enlargement of subject matter jurisdiction, 33
liberalized probate would necessitate modification of the common law
rule that a testator's last will governs the disposition of his estate. Legisla-
non might be enacted to provide that a testator's last will shall control
the disposition of his estate, except that testamentary dispositions which
a testator has contracted to make or to leave in force and which would
be enforceable in equity shall take precedence over any inconsistent dis-
positions made in the last will, such contractual dispositions to be given
effect in probate.
Although Professor Sparks recognizes that "since the contract is valid
and may be enforced at law or in equity it is merely prolonging litigation
to deny complete relief in the probate court," 134 he labels a "misguided
notion" the argument that the probate court should be given power to
determine the validity of the contract.3 5 His reasons for such a conclu-
sion are several: (1) an ultimate beneficiary under a contractual will is
not a proper party to contest a later revoking will; (2) probate courts
generally lack the machinery or jurisdiction for determining the validity
of contracts; (3) the findings of a probate court are not res judicata as
to an action on the same matter at law or in equity; (4) where a con-
tractual will disposes of only part of the testator's estate, another will
disposing of the remainder may have to be probated with resulting con-
fusion; (5) the essence of such a proceeding in a probate court would be
the determination of the validity of the contract, a matter with which
the court is usually unfamiliar; and (6) the definition of a will would be
132. It should be noted, however, that the courts of Kansas have construed that state's
probate code liberally, holding that a suit on a contract is a contest of an inconsistent
will. Yeager v. Yeager, 155 Kan. 734, 129 P.2d 242 (1942). The applicable statute pro-
vides that the probate courts have original jurisdiction to admit last wills to probate,
as well as such powers "as may be necessary and proper fully to hear and determine any
matter properly before such courts." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-301 (1963) This language
has been held to confer upon the probate court exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the oral
contract of a decedent to devise real estate. Dixon v. Fluker, 155 Kan. 399, 125 P.2d 364
(1942). It should be observed that in Dixon no will was involved; the claim was made
by the beneficiaries of the alleged contract against the heirs in intestacy Although the
probate courts of Kansas thus have a wide scope of authority, it does not appear that
any case yet has been decided in which a probate court has gone so far as to set aside a
will or a part thereof in order to enforce a testator's contractual promise to devise or
bequeath property Nor does such a step appear to have been taken in other jurisdictions.
133. Some states now have legislation which grants equitable powers to probate courts.
See, e.g., ORE. RFv. STAT. § 111.095(1) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. SURR. CT. PRo. § 201.3 (Mc-
Kinney 1967).
134. B. SPAiuts, supra note 1, at 126.
135. Id.
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fundamentally altered by the requirement that a valid will could not be
inconsistent with an outstanding contractual obligation relative to the
estate. 3 6
It is subrmtted that the objections that an ultimate beneficiary under a
contractual will is not a proper party to contest a later revoking will, that
probate courts lack the necessary machinery or jurisdiction for deter-
mining the validity of the contract, and that the findings of a probate
court are not res judicata at law or in equity could be overcome immedi-
ately by statute. In addition, the objection that a new element would be
added to the execution of wills is hardly an objection at all, in view of
the fact that the purpose of liberalized probate is to modify the rule con-
cerning validity of a testator's last will. The remaining objections are
concerned with the competence of probate courts to adjudicate contract
matters in a liberalized probate proceeding. Although difficulties in dis-
tributing an estate may arise where some of the property devolves in
accordance with a will and other property is transferred according to
the terms of a contract, problems of distributing an estate under a will
partially revoked by a later codicil are analogous and are familiar to
probate courts. The problem of the unfamiliarity of probate judges with
contract law would not arise in those jurisdictions where a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction sits as a probate court. Moreover, even where the pro-
bate court is separate from other courts, if the probate judge has had
legal training, the contract principles involved should not be difficult to
master; only in those jurisdictions where probate judges are not required
to have legal training would the problem appear significant.
Although the Uniform Probate Code makes no express provision for
the enforcement of contractual arrangements to leave wills, a provision
for expanded probate would be consonant with the stated purpose of the
Code: to promote "a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the
estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors." 137 How-
ever, any attempt by the draftsmen of the Code to reorganize judicial
functioning along uniform lines would be limited by the variety of state
constitutional provisions creating and authorizing their respective judicial
establishments. Uniform legislation proposed for multistate adoption
necessarily must speak in general terms on those subjects which approach
constitutional boundaries. Accordingly, the Code's treatment of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction would have to be limited by reference to the
state constitution, as it now is in section 1-302:
136. Id. at 126-27.
137. UN 'ORI PROBA' CODE § 1-102 (b) (3).
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(a) To the full extent permntted by the constitution, the Court
has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to (1) estates of
decedents, including construction of wills and determination of
heirs and successors of decedents, and estates of protected persons;
(2) protection of mnnors and incapacitated persons; and (3)
trusts. 138
In a state where authority to define probate court subject matter juris-
diction is vested in the legislature, the language of the Uniform Probate
Code might be modified by the addition of a sentence broadening the
probate court's jurisdiction, such as: "The subject matter jurisdiction of
the Court shall include power to construe and enforce contracts to make
wills or devises, or not to revoke wills or devises, or to die intestate."
Such a change would necessitate a modification of section 3-101, dealing
with the devolution of estates in accordance with the last will or the laws
of intestacy, so as to read: "Upon the death of a person, his real and
personal property, except that property which is the sublect of a con-
tract to make a 'will or devise, or not to revoke a 'will or devise, or to
die intestate, devolves to the persons " In addition, the following
sentence could be added to section 3-101. "Contracts to make wills or
devises, or not to revoke wills or devises, or to die intestate shall be en-
forced as against inconsistent provisions of otherwise valid wills, not-
withstanding any provisions of this Code governing intestate succession."
An alternative to liberalizing probate by granting the probate court
power to set aside dispositions of a last will would be to permit the pro-
bate court, through its function of supervising the administration of de-
cedents' estates, to effect a "distribution" of the estate consistent with a
contract.1 9 Professor Sparks has proposed that since the probate court
possesses the power of supervision over the personal representative who
succeeds to the estate of a decedent for the purpose of distributing the
estate or its proceeds to the parties entitled thereto, 140 the claim of a party
to a contract not to revoke a prior will could be recognized at the stage
of administration. His proposal notes:
138. Id. § 1-302 (emphasis supplied). The same section continues:
(b) The Court has full power to make orders, judgments and decrees and
take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters
which come before it.
139. B. SPARKs, supra note 1, at 132.
140. 1 PAGE oN WuIs, supra note 9, § 1.3; 1 J. WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw oF ADMIN-
ISTATION § 10 (3d ed. 1923)
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[W]hen the personal representative succeeds to the estate of the
deceased he takes it subject to whatever burdens or encumbrances
that exist against it. A contract to devise or bequeath creates an
equitable right in the prormsee. That equitable right in the promisee
constitutes an encumbrance or burden upon the estate and may be
asserted by filing a claim in the probate court in the usual manner
prescribed for the filing of ordinary claims against a decedent's
estate. This type of procedure does not question the admission of
the last will to probate. It is a claim against the estate and if recog-
nized might have the effect of consuming part or all the property
before the provisions of the will are applied to it.
141
The effectiveness of this procedure would depend upon the power of
the probate court to adjudicate claims against the estate. Many states
penmit their probate courts to allow claims against an estate but vest no
authority in such courts to enforce payments of the claims. 142 Other states
vest equitable powers in the probate courts, enabling them to compel spe-
cific performance or to impress a trust.14 The proceedings in such juris-
dictions, however, are of a summary nature; all states, regardless of the
scope of powers granted to their probate courts, reserve to litigants the
right of appeal to courts of plenary jurisdiction where the matter may
be taken up in a trial de novo.144
Thus, treating a promisee's right under a contract to make or not to
revoke a testamentary disposition as a claim against the estate affecting
the distribution of that estate would not necessarily achieve the desired
result of eliminating separate litigation. Nevertheless, at least in cases
in which a claim is uncontested, the matter could be settled within the
probate court, subject, of course, to the variations which exist in the
powers of different state probate courts."45
VI. CONCLUSION
The practical consequences of executing joint or mutual wills should
be of paramount importance to the draftsman of testamentary mstru-
.141. B. SPAR.Ks, supra note 1, at 133.
142. 2 J. WoERNER, supra note 140, 5 391.
143. Id. § 392.
144. Id. § 391.
145. In recogmtion of these variations, the Uniform Probate Code describes only m
general fashion the powers of a probate court to adjudicate clamis against an estate:
"[Tihe primary purpose of Article III is to describe functions tobe performed by van-
pus public offiials, rather than to prescribe how these responsibilities should be assigned
wathin a given state or county" UNWoRM PROATE COPE § -105, Comment.
-1973]
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ments. In this regard, it should be noted that there are numerous con-
siderations militating against the employment of such wills.146 A funda-
mental disadvantage is the possibility that courts will construe a joint
will or mutual wills as having been executed pursuant to a contractual
arrangement when in fact no contract existed. Some courts have inferred
the existence of a contract from the mere execution of the wills, while
others have required only a mimmal quantum of proof.
An even greater disadvantage of joint or mutual wills stems from the
serious consequences which may result from limitations imposed upon
the testator's flexibility and freedom in arranging his affairs. For example,
soon after a young couple execute mutual wills, the wife might die. If
the husband remarries and attempts to revise his estate plan to be con-
sistent with the changed family situation, he may be precluded from pro-
viding fully for his second spouse and the children of the second marriage
even though he and his first wife never intended to be bound by their
mutual wills. Even if the parties desire a binding arrangement, the use
of a joint will or mutual wills would be ill advised. 14 7 Under such circum-
stances, a trust instrument often could provide the desired features of
permanence and irrevocability, while placing with the trustee powers to
meet certain future contingencies not predictable at the time of execu-
tion.148
Related to the possibility that joint or mutual wills may freeze the
testamentary aspects of an estate plan are the restrictions which may be
imposed upon inter vivos use and disposition of a party's estate 49 Con-
tractual devices may preclude the use or disposition of the testator's
property in any manner which would impair the third party beneficiary's
interesti 5 ° For instance, when specific realty is involved, the testator
might not be able to mortgage or encumber more than his life interest.151
146. A number of courts and commentators have advised against employment of joint
wills and mutual wills. See, e.g., H. HARRIs, FAMILY EsTATE PLANNING GUIDE §S 86, 250
(1957); D. REMSEN, TI PREPARATION OF WIUS AND TRus-rs ch. II, § 6 (2d ed. 1930).
147. Beyond the possibility that a party to a joint or mutual will arrangement would
be unable to change beneficiaries to meet changing circumstances is the chance that he
would be unable to revise his testamentary plans to adapt to changes in the nature or
extent of his estate. This problem is especially troublesome when specific bequests or
devises are involved. See, e.g., Lamberg v Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972); First
Nat'l Bank v. Friednash, 72 Nev. 237, 302 P.2d 281 (1956).
148. See generally J. FARE, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK S 15 (3d ed. 1966).
149. See generally B. SPARKs, supra note 1, at 50-69.
150. Id. at 109-10.
151. Id. at 54. Provisions in a will for general bequests pose the difficulty for a
court of setting forth a standard. A few courts have taken the position that the testator
may use and dispose of his property freely during his lifetime unless it can be shown
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CONTRACTS NOT TO REVOKE
One of the primary concerns in deciding upon a testamentary scheme
is the effect of the federal estate tax. The use of joint or mutual wills
may have a detrimental effect upon the testator's freedom to rewrite his
will to reflect new tax developments.152 In light of the frequent changes
which occur in the federal, estate and state inheritance tax laws, a wise
planner will retain the freedom to change his testamentary scheme to
reflect favorable tax developments and to avoid the imposition of new
tax burdens.15
that the testator is acting with an actual intent to defeat the contract. See, e.g., Schauer
v. Schauer, 43 N.M. 209, 89 P.2d 521 (1939) The more accepted theory is that actual
intent need not be shown; rather, any inter vivos disposal which is out of proportion
with the testator's estate is invalid and may be set aside. See, e.g., Bruce v. Moon, 57
S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1900); Swingley v. Danels, 123 Wash. 409, 212 P. 729 (1923). The
difficulty of applying a precise standard is illustrated in Turner v. Them, 129 W Va.
23, 34, 38 S.E.2d 369, 376 (1946) (emphasis supplied)-
[T~he rights of the makers of such wills to dispose of his or her property
m good faith during his or her lifetime is not affected. But a survivor, in
bad faith or in fraud of the rights of the beneficiaries of the testamentary
agreement, cannot make an unreasonable disposition of his or her property
See also Boner's Adin'x v. Chesnut's Ex'r, 317 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (Ky. 1958); B. SPARKS,
supra note 1, at 63.
152. See Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213, 1218 (2d Cir. 1972). Analysis and dis-
cussion of the tax implications of executing joint wills and mutual wills may be found in
Sparks, Application of the Marital Deduction to Joint and Mutual Wills, 37 Miss. L.J.
226 (1966); Comment, Estate, Gift, and Inheritance Taxes and the Joint and Mutual Will,
16 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 407 (1964); Comment, Federal Estate Tax-Jornt Wills and the Marital
Deduction, 1964 DunE LJ. 562; Comment, Joint and Mutual Wills m Nebraska and the
Marital Deduction, 46 NEB. L. Rv. 872 (1967); Comment, The Mysterious Non-Termm-
able Interest: Reciprocal Wills, Inter-Spousal Contracts, joint Tenancies, and the Federal
Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 55 Nw U.L. Rzv. 727 (1961); Comment, The Contractual
Will: Invitation to Litigation and Excess Taxation, 48 TEx. L. REv. 909 (1970).
153. The undesirability of joint wills or mutual wills in the federal estate tax context
arises from the possible loss of the marital deduction where spouses have provided for
the estate to pass to the survivor of them and, on his or her death, to a third party. The
marital deduction permits the exclusion from tax of that amount, not exceeding one-half
of the adjusted gross estate, which passes or has passed to the decedent's surviving spouse.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. However, the deduction is subject to the qualification
that the estate which passes to the spouse must be, as one commentator has termed it,
"in the nature of a fee simple absolute." Sparks, Application of the Marital Deduction to
Joint and Mutual Wills, 37 Miss. LJ. 226 (1966). The problem then centers on the effect
which the survivor's obligation to -will his estate or a part thereof to a third party will
have upon the qualification that the survivor's interest in the estate cannot be in the
nature of a life estate or a terminable interest.
The cases have dealt with several variations of the overall problem, and generalizations
are difficult. See generally 4 J. MERTENs, Tim LAW OF FznmEAL Gwr & EsrATz TAxATiON
§ 29.28 (1959). In what is perhaps the leading case, it was conceded that the interest
received by the surviving spouse in property not held jointly was terminable and there-
fore did not qualify for the marital deduction. The court then turned to the issue of the
property which had been held in joint tenancy and concluded that since under state
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In addition to producing inflexibility, the use of joint or mutual wills
may result mn protracted litigation, which not only might delay enjoy-
ment of the estate by the ultimate beneficiary but also could dissipate a
sizable portion of the estate through legal fees and court costs. 154
It thus would appear that the use of a joint will or mutual wills should
be avoided whenever possible. When it is convenient or necessary to use
wills with reciprocal provisions or if a joint will is insisted upon, the will
or wills should recite whether a contractual arrangement is contemplated.
If a contract is involved, the parties should employ a separate writing
evidencing the agreement, with copies thereof attached to the will or
wills.
155
law the wife's title was derived from the joint tenancy and was therefore not terminable,
it qualified for the marital deduction. Estate of Nelson v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 720 (5th
Cir. 1956) This decision as to jointly held property has been adopted by other courts.
McLean v. Umted States, 224 F Supp. 726 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Schildmeier v. United
States, 171 F Supp. 328 (S.D. Ind. 1959) The Tax Court has made a distinction between
bequests of specific property and bequests of property of a general class, holding that
the former does not qualify for the marital deduction, while the latter does. Estate of
James Mead Vermilya, 41 T.C. 226 (1963). The contention of the Internal Revenue
Service has been that the survivor's interest is terminable, even if the property is held
jointly. FED. ESr. & Garr TAx. RE_'. 2081.08.
154. See H. HAmus, supra note 146, § 250; D. REMSEN, supra note 146, ch. II, § 6; G.
THoMpsoN, THE LAW OF WILLs § 34 (3d ed. 1947).
155. See generally Lamberg v. Callahan, 455 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972); H. HAiMs, supra
note 146, § 250; B. SPARKs, supra note 1, at 192; Evans, supra note 5, at 98.
The following provision has been suggested to preclude the possibility of joint or
mutual wills being construed as contractual where no contract is intended:
We do hereby declare that the mutual and reciprocal dispositive pro-
visions herein for the benefit of the other have not been made pursuant to
any agreement or understanding that they have been in consideration of the
other similarly providing, and each of us reserve to ourselves, severally, the
right, power and privilege to revoke said will, without notice by either to
the other, under any and all circumstances, and irrespective of the death
of either.
H. HARRIS, supra note 146, § 250.
Conversely, if a contract is contemplated, the following provision may be helpful:
Our purpose in making this joint and reciprocal Will is to dispose of
our property in accordance with a carefully considered common plan; the
reciprocal and other gifts and bequests made herein are made in fulfillment
of this purpose and in consideration of each of us waiving any and all right
to alter, amend, or revoke this Will in whole or in part, by Codicil or
otherwise, without written consent of the other during our joint lives, or
under any circumstances after the death of the first of us.
In re Shepherd's Estate, 130 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1961).
